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Perhaps surprisingly, under current federal law a criminal defen-
dant may be sentenced to pay restitution to a victim. This result seems
contradictory to the common view that most criminals are indigent.
Indeed, one may argue that poverty often provides the impetus for a
crime.' Despite this anomaly, Congress incorporated restitution into
the criminal system in the 1982 Victim and Witness Protection Act
("VWPA").2
The VWPA, which originally applied to almost all federal crimes,
gives the trial judge considerable discretion in determining whether to
order restitution, although this discretion is limited by several factors.3
Most importantly, in determining whether to order restitution, the
court was directed by the statute to consider the ability to pay.'
In 1996, Congress enacted a related provision, the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA").' The MVRA replaces portions of
the VWPA; however, like the VWPA, it also authorizes courts to issue
t B.A. 1997, University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
1 See James K. Stewart, The Urban Strangler: How Crime Causes Poverty in the Inner City,
37 Pol Rev 6, 6 (Summer 1986) (noting "[t]he idea that poverty causes crime goes back at least as
far as Aristotle, who called poverty 'the parent of revolution and crime'"); Charles E. Silberman,
Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice 87-116 (Random House 1978) (arguing that poverty is a ma-
jor cause of crime); Mabel A. Elliott, Crime in Modern Society 385 (Harper & Brothers 1952)
(discussing economic causes of crime).
2 Pub L No 97-291,96 Stat 1248 (1982), codified at 18 USC § 3663 (1994 & Supp 1998).
3 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II). The statute lists the following factors to be considered by
a court in determining whether to order restitution: "the financial resources of the defendant, the
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such
other factors as the court deems appropriate." Id.
4 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II).
5 Pub L No 104-132,110 Stat 1227 (1996), codified at 18 USC § 3663A (Supp 1998).
6 When the MVRA was enacted, the VWPA was amended to apply only to those offenses
"other than an offense described in [the MVRA]." 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A).
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restitution orders while sentencing a criminal defendant.7 The MVRA
removes certain crimes from the scope of the VWPA,8 namely crimes
of violence; offenses against property, including any committed by
fraud and deceit; and offenses relating to tampering with consumer
products.9 As the name implies, the MVRA makes a restitution order
mandatory for certain crimes and renders the defendant's ability to
pay irrelevant in determining the amount of the restitution order."0
Thus, an indigent defendant whose crime falls under the MVRA will
always be ordered to pay restitution while an indigent defendant un-
der the VWPA has only a chance of receiving such an order. This
change in the law has been uniformly agreed to constitute an "in-
crease" in punishment," which invokes the Ex Post Facto Clause."
Congress stated that the MVRA would be effective, "to the ex-
tent constitutionally permissible ... for sentencing proceedings in
cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after" April 24, 1996."3
By emphasizing the conviction date, instead of the date of the crime,
Congress has forced some courts to tackle the issue of whether appli-
cation of the MVRA to defendants convicted after April 24, 1996, but
who committed the crime before April 24, 1996, violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution."
Currently the circuit courts disagree over whether retroactive ap-
plication of the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because the
Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to criminal penalties, the crucial
point of dissension has been whether restitution is a civil or criminal
penalty under the MVRA. l5 If the MVRA is a criminal statute then
the Ex Post Facto Clause applies; if the MVRA is a civil statute then
the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply. This classification is signifi-
7 See 18 USC §§ 3663, 3663A.
8 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A) (stating that the VWPA does not apply to "an offense described
in" the MVRA).
9 18 USC § 3663A(c)(1)(A).
10 18 USC § 3663A (not mentioning the defendant's ability to pay).
11 See United States v Newman, 144 F3d 531, 537 n 5 (7th Cir 1998) (noting the change
from discretionary to mandatory "constitute[s] an 'increase' in punishment"); United States v
Bagget, 125 F3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir 1997) (holding "[tlhe MVRA ... caused a substantive change
in the VWPA to [defendants'] detriment").
12 See Calder v Bull, 3 US (3 Dallas) 385,390 (1798) (noting that the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits the retroactive application of "[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment").
13 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act § 211, codified at 18 USC § 2248 note (Supp 1998)
(effective date of 1996 amendments).
14 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
15 Compare United States v Williams, 128 F3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir 1997) ("We conclude an
order of restitution under the MVRA is punishment for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes."), with
Newman, 144 F3d at 542 ("For all of these reasons, we hold that restitution authorized by the
VWPA (and mandatorily imposed under the MVRA) is not a criminal punishment for the pur-
poses of the Ex Post Facto Clause.").
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cant to other constitutional clauses as well, such as the Double Jeop-
16
ardy Clause, which only applies to criminal penalties, and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, which only applies to civil cases.
Restitution under the MVRA could reasonably be viewed as ei-
ther civil or criminal, but courts should interpret restitution as a
criminal penalty. The basic tools of statutory construction indicate that
both the civil and criminal interpretation of restitution are equally
plausible. Construing restitution as a civil penalty, however, implicates
serious Seventh Amendment concerns.8 Applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance,9 this Comment argues that restitution
should be construed as a criminal penalty under the MVRA to avoid
Seventh Amendment concerns. Because restitution under the MVRA
should be considered a criminal penalty, retroactive application of the
MVRA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.0
The Comment proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the Supreme
Court's Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence with particular focus on
the Court's guidelines regarding the civil/criminal distinction. Part II
then analyzes the circuit courts' debate over the interplay between the
MVRA and the Ex Post Facto Clause." Part III concludes that courts
should interpret restitution under the MVRA as a criminal penalty
and declare the Act's retroactive application unconstitutional.
16 US Const Amend V. See Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391,399 (1937) (stating the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal sanctions). See also United States v Ward, 448 US
242, 248 (1980) (stating that the civil/criminal distinction is important to evaluate Fifth and Sixth
Amendment issues).
17 See US Const Amend VII.
18 US Const Amend VII (providing a right to jury "[i]n Suits at common law").
19 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Bldg & Constr Trade Council, 485
US 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise seri-
ous constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems."). See
also notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
20 Although this ex post facto problem will arise less often as time passes, because of the
serious lag time of the federal courts, criminals who have committed crimes before April 24,
1996, will continue to be brought before the courts. In addition, classification of restitution under
the MVRA is important because it can affect holdings under constitutional provisions other than
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
21 This Comment will only address crimes that were completed before the effective date,
April 24, 1996. Continuing offense crimes pose a different question from completed crimes in
that they may have started before the effective date but continued beyond such a date. These
types of crimes will not be discussed as they involve different issues. See, for example, United
States v Futrell, 209 F3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir 2000) (holding the "ongoing nature of the con-
spiracy enables application of the [MVRA] without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause" despite
its precedent that "the MVRA clearly does not apply to a defendant whose criminal conduct oc-
curred and ceased prior to April 24, 1996").
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S EX POST FACTO CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Article I of the United States Constitution expressly states "[n]o
... ex post facto Law shall be passed."" Although the prohibition is
explicit, the Constitution offers no additional guidance in determining
what constitutes an ex post facto law. Accordingly, courts have as-
sumed the duty of developing standards for analyzing ex post facto is-
sues. The Supreme Court initially examined the scope of the Ex Post
Facto Clause in the 1798 case Calder v Bull.3 In that case, the Court
listed four categories of laws that would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.4 Since Calder, the Court has developed a two-part test for
analyzing ex post facto issues. In Weaver v Graham,25 the Court stated
that "for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retro-
spective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment,
and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it."2 The Court also
noted that "no ex post facto violation occurs if the change effected is
merely procedural" as opposed to a substantive change.27
As the Court alludes in Weaver," a law must be criminal or penal
in order for the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply." Consequently, before
an ex post facto analysis is begun, the Supreme Court has held that a
22 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3. See also id § 10, cl 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post
facto Law.").
23 3 US (3 Dallas) 385 (1798) (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not prohibit
every retrospective law).
24 The Court stated:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was inno-
cent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-
ment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when commit-
ted. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different tes-
timony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to con-
vict the offender.
Id at 390.
25 450 US 24 (1981) (holding that a Florida law that reduced the time deducted from a
prison sentence for good behavior could only constitutionally apply to inmates who had commit-
ted crimes after the passage of the law).
26 Id at 29.
27 Id at 29 n 12. See also note 206.
28 Id at 29.
29 See Collins v Youngblood, 497 US 37, 41 (1990) (acknowledging that "[a]lthough the
Latin phrase 'ex post facto' literally encompasses any law passed 'after the fact,' it has long been
recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to
penal statutes"); Marcello v Bonds, 349 US 302, 319-20 (1955) ("The Court [ I has stated over
and over again ... that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only in criminal cases."); Harisiades v
Shaughnessy, 342 US 580,595 (1952) ("The inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law
... applies only to criminal laws."); Republic Natural Gas Co v Oklahoma, 334 US 62, 90 n 21
(1948) (noting that "ex post facto legislation .. . was limited to criminal and penal conse-
quences"). See also Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 369 (1997) (stating that "an essential pre-
requisite" for the Ex Post Facto Clause is that the act is punitive).
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court must first determine whether the penalty involved is civil or
criminal." In determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal, the
Supreme Court has stressed that the question is first one of statutory
construction.' If the legislature has a stated intent, then courts should
defer to it.32 Thus, the first step in determining whether a law violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause is to determine congressional intent by ex-
amining the statute. Although a clear intent to treat a penalty as civil
is not dispositive, it carries significant weight.33 Courts should "reject
the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the
statute provides 'the clearest proof that 'the statutory scheme [is] so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention'
to deem it 'civil."''
The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors to con-
sider when determining whether a statute is clearly punitive. Although
these factors are gleaned from various Supreme Court cases, the
Court consolidated them into a single list of seven factors in Kennedy
v Mendoza-Martinez." The factors are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether
its operation will promote traditional aims of punishment: retri-
bution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable to it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.36
30 Not all of the Supreme Court cases regarding the civil/criminal penalty distinction ad-
dress the, issue in the ex post facto context. Some involve the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. However, these cases are applicable to the Ex Post Facto Clause
because the Supreme Court has implied that there is not a difference in evaluating the
civil/criminal distinction under the various constitutional safeguards. In United States v Ward, 448
US 242,248 (1980), the Court commented that the distinction between a civil and criminal pen-
alty is important to evaluate both Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues. Later in Hendricks, 521 US
at 361, the Court collapsed its analysis of the civil/criminal distinction under both the double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Thus, the standard applies in the ex post facto context despite
the fact that not all of the cases generating this standard involve the Ex Post Facto Clause.
31 See Hendricks, 521 US at 361 (stating that the "categorization of a particular proceeding
as civil or criminal 'is first of all a question of statutory construction"'), quoting Allen v Illinois,
478 US 364, 368 (1986); Ward, 448 US at 248 (remarking "[t]his Court has often stated that the
question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statu-
tory construction"); Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391,399 (1938) (noting the question of whether
the sanction is criminal is "one of statutory construction").
32 Hendricks, 521 US at 361 (stating that "we ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated in-
tent").
33 Id.
34 Id, quoting Ward, 448 US at 248-49.
35 372 US 144 (1963).
36 Id at 168-69.
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The first five factors attempt to determine whether the penalty has
criminal characteristics. It may be useful to think of these factors as
judging how closely a sanction resembles imprisonment, which is in-
disputably a criminal sanction.3 For example, the first factor asks
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, a
characteristic that clearly fits imprisonment. The sixth and seventh fac-
tors question whether the sanction has civil purposes in addition to
the criminal purposes of deterrence and retribution.3
Despite setting forth this list, the Court, in Mendoza-Martinez,
acknowledged the uncertainty that is inherent in the civil/criminal dis-
tinction.39 The Court admitted that application of the factors could be
"extremely difficult and elusive of solution" and that the factors "may
often point in differing directions.' ' 0 However, the Court has repeat-
edly relied on these factors in making a civil/criminal distinction.'
Such a distinction is necessary because of the many constitutional
provisions that are triggered by classifying a penalty as criminal.4 '2 The
current debate43 over the retroactive application of the MVRA illus-
trates both the significance and complexity of the civil/criminal dis-
tinction.
II. MANDATORY VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT
A. History of the MVRA
Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act on
April 24, 1996," to replace parts of the discretionary restitution provi-
sion in the VWPA with a mandatory restitution provision. Some
members of Congress, in debating the passage of the MVRA, noted
37 See Austin v United States, 509 US 602,620 (1993) (mentioning "the traditional criminal
sanction [ ] of... imprisonment"); Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603, 617 (1960) (noting the "'infa-
mous punishment' of imprisonment").
38 See Kelly v Robinson, 479 US 36, 53 (1986) (stating "criminal proceedings focus on the
State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensa-
tion").
39 372 US at 168-69.
40 Id.
41 See, for example, Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99-100 (1997) (noting the Men-
doza-Martinez factors "provide useful guideposts"); Hendricks, 521 US at 361-64 (applying the
Mendoza-Martinez factors); Ward, 448 US at 249 (stating that while the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors "certainly [are] neither exhaustive nor dispositive, [they have] proved helpful" in determin-
ing whether a penalty was civil or criminal); Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520,537-38 (1979) (listing the
Mendoza-Martinez factors and noting that they "provide useful guideposts").
42 Many of the procedural safeguards in the Constitution are limited to criminal matters.
See, for example, the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination, US Const Amend V,
and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, US Const
Amend VIII. See also notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
43 See note 15.
- 18 USC § 3663A.
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with displeasure the low number of restitution orders being issued
under the VWPA. Senator Hatch, a cosponsor of the Bill, stated,
"[f]ederal courts ordered restitution in only 20.2 percent of criminal
cases," which broke down to "only 27.9 percent of all murders, 28.2
percent of all kidnappings, 55.2 percent of all robberies, and 12.5 per-
cent of all sexual abuse[ ] cases.''4 5 He further stated this was "simply
not enough." Senator Feinstein complained that "so many people in
our society are affected by crime.... And yet, restitution to the victim
is infrequently awarded."7 The Committee Report noted, "As a matter
of practice, restitution is infrequently used and indifferently en-
forced."" By making restitution mandatory for certain crimes, some
members of Congress clearly hoped to increase the number of restitu-
tion orders.
The MVRA replaces portions of a related law, the VWPA. The
VWPA applies only to offenses "other than an offense described in
[the MVRA].",4' The original scope of the VWPA0 was extremely
broad; it included all offenses under Title 18, the section that details
most federal crimes." The VWPA also gives the trial judge a large
amount of discretion, limited only by a few factors, to determine
whether an order of restitution should issue. These factors include
"the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and
earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and
such other factors as the court deems appropriate.52
Unlike the VWPA, the MVRA does not apply to every criminal
act under Title 18; it applies only to specified offenses: crimes of vio-
lence; offenses against property, including those committed by fraud
or deceit; and offenses related to tampering with consumer products.53
However, despite its narrower scope, the MVRA is harsher than the
VWPA, because under the MVRA, a judge must order restitution in
every circumstance, regardless of the defendant's financial situation."
The judge is stripped of any discretion in making such an order and
the defendant's ability to pay becomes irrelevant.
45 141 Cong Rec S 19277 (Dec 22, 1995) (statement of Sen Hatch).
46 Id.
47 141 Cong Rec S 19280 (Dec 22,1995) (statement of Sen Feinstein).
48 Victim Restitution Act of 1995, S Rep No 104-179, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 13 (1995), re-
printed in 1996 USCCAN 925.
49 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A).
50 18 USC § 3663 (1988).
51 "The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this title or un-
der subsection (h), (i), (j), or (n) of section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
1472), may order.... 18 USC § 3663(a) (1988).
52 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II).
53 18 USC § 3663A(c)(1).
54 "[Tihe court shall order ... that the defendant make restitution to the victim." 18 USC
§ 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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B. Circuit Court Cases Dealing with the MVRA
1. The majority view.
The majority of circuit courts encountering the issue of retroac-
tive application of the MVRA have held that such application would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." Although some of the circuit courts
did not provide any reasons for such a holding,6 most of the courts
have reasoned both that restitution is a criminal penalty to which the
Ex Post Facto Clause applies, and that the MVRA constitutes a sub-
stantive change, as required by the Supreme Court test in Weaver.1
7
The disagreement dividing the majority and minority views focuses on
whether restitution under the MVRA is a civil or criminal penalty; all
courts agree that the MVRA constitutes a substantive change.1
8
In United States v Williams," the Eighth Circuit held that "an or-
der of restitution under the MVRA is punishment for Ex Post Facto
Clause purposes." In doing so, the court was forced to distinguish a
previous decision involving a different statute, in which the court had
held that restitution was not a criminal penalty for purposes of Ex
Post Facto Clause analysis." The court distinguished the previous deci-
55 See United States v Richards, 204 F3d 177, 213 (5th Cir 2000) (accepting the majority
view of restitution as a criminal penalty and thus holding that "[r]etroactive application of the
MVRA ... would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause"); United States v Edwards, 162 F3d 87,92 (3d
Cir 1998) (finding "that under the MVRA, restitution is punishment, and that retrospective ap-
plication of that punishment ... is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v Siegel,
153 F3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir 1998) (stating it was "persuaded by the analysis adopted in the ma-
jority of the circuits on this issue" and thus holding "that the MVRA cannot be applied to a per-
son whose criminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996"); United States v Bapack, 129 F3d
1320, 1327 n 13 (DC Cir 1997) (concluding in a footnote that retroactive application of the
MVRA to the defendant would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v Williams, 128
F3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir 1997) (concluding that "an order of restitution under the MVRA is pun-
ishment for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes"); United States v Baggett, 125 F3d 1319,1322 (9th Cir
1997) (holding that the court must use the old VWPA "to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post
Facto Clause"); United States v Thompson, 113 F3d 13, 15 n 1 (2d Cir 1997) (noting simply that
"application of the [MVRA] to this case would be barred by the ex post facto clause").
56 See Bapack, 129 F3d at 1327 n 13 (making the statement in a footnote without any
analysis); Thompson, 113 F3d at 15 n 1 (same).
57 See Weaver, 450 US 24. See also text accompanying notes 25-27.
58 Seenote 11.
59 128 F3d 1239 (8th Cir 1997).
60 Id at 1241. Although the court determined that retroactive application of the MVRA
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court held that in this case the restitution order was
permissible because the order was based on an offense that occurred on May 30, 1996, a month
after the MVRA was enacted. Id.
61 See United States v Crawford, 115 F3d 1397, 1403 (8th Cir 1997) (holding that restitution
is not punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause). The statute at issue in Craw-
ford is the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA"), 18 USC § 228 (1994). This Act was
also the subject of a number of ex post facto challenges. The CSRA punishes a person who "will-
fully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another
State." Id § 228(a). The Act contains twb separate sections, one entitled "Punishment" and the
other entitled "Restitution." Id § 228(b), (c). The Restitution section directs a court to "order res-
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sion on the ground that the plain wording of the MVRA compelled a
different result.' In making this determination, the court looked to a
phrase contained in the MVRA stating that the court may order resti-
tution "in addition to ... any other penalty authorized by law." The
use of the word "penalty" was considered to be dispositive evidence
that restitution under the MVRA was "punishment for Ex Post Facto
Clause purposes.'
In United States v Siegel,5 the Eleventh Circuit began its examina-
tion of whether retroactive application of the MVRA was impermissi-
ble by considering the statutory language of the Act.6 Much like the
Eighth Circuit in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the
word "penalty" and held that the plain meaning of the statute re-
quired characterizing restitution as a criminal penalty6 The court bol-
stered its conclusion by citing its own and other circuit courts' prece-
dent, outside the context of the Ex Post Facto Clause, that character-
ized restitution as a criminal penalty. Based on these precedents, the
titution ... in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sen-
tencing." Id § 228(c). Unlike the MVRA, the CSRA has uniformly withstood ex post facto chal-
lenges. One key difference between the CSRA and the MVRA is that failure to pay child sup-
port can be viewed as a new offense. In other words, although a parent may be guilty of not pay-
ing child support before the CSRA was enacted, if the parent has still not paid it at some point
after the enactment, the offense is a new willful failure to pay a past due child support obligation.
The Eighth Circuit held that the CSRA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on two grounds.
One was that restitution was not "punishment" as discussed in the text. However, the alternative
holding was that there was no retroactive application because the defendant committed the
crime after the enactment date by still refusing to pay. This type of reasoning was also employed
by the Fifth Circuit in United States v Rose, 153 F3d 208 (5th Cir 1998). The court noted that the
CSRA did not apply retrospectively because there is no change in legal obligations. Id at 209-10.
The Fifth Circuit explicitly noted that it refused to base its holding even in part on the notion
that "restitution does not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto
Clause." Id at 211 n 1. This was based on its prior precedent characterizing restitution as a crimi-
nal penalty. Id. The other courts that have held the CSRA does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause are the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in United States v Black, 125 F3d 454 (7th Cir 1997),
and United States v Hampshire, 95 F3d 999 (10th Cir 1996), respectively. Both of these courts
have based their holdings on the view of restitution under the CSRA as a civil remedy, which is
consistent with their view of restitution under the MVRA.
62 Williams, 128 F3d at 1241.
63 Id, quoting 18 USC § 3663A(a)(1).
64 Williams, 128 F3d at 1241. The court did not address the fact that a penalty can also be
civil, an issue that the Seventh Circuit later raised. See text accompanying notes 92-93.
65 153 F3d 1256 (11th Cir 1998).
66 Id at 1259.
67 See notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
68 Siegel, 153 F3d at 1259.
69 See United States v Twitty, 107 F3d 1482,1493 n 12 (11th Cir 1997) (asserting restitution
is "a criminal penalty meant to have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect"), quoting United
States v Hairston, 888 F2d 1349,1355 (11th Cir 1989). For a case outside the Eleventh Circuit, see
United States v Dubose, 146 F3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir 1998) (contending that restitution under the
MVRA is punishment because it has "deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive purposes" in the
context of an Eighth Amendment challenge).
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court concluded that "restitution under the MVRA is a [criminal]
penalty."70 Accordingly, it held that retroactive application of the
MVRA was impermissible.7
In United States v Edwards, the Third Circuit also espoused the
majority view.72 The Third Circuit discussed United States v Newman,73
but stated that it believed "the majority view [to be] the better view.""
The court based its interpretation on the "statutory scheme and the
legislative history of the MVRA."7 The court believed that the inclu-
sion of restitution as "an integral and necessary part of sentencing, su-
pervised release, and probation for the crimes it implicates" in the
statutory scheme demonstrated that Congress viewed restitution as a
criminal penalty. Additionally, the Third Circuit referenced the
MVRA's legislative history to support its view.7 In particular, it indi-
cated that the legislative history demonstrated that Congress believed
"mandatory restitution forces an individual defendant to address the
harm his crime has caused to the individual victims of his crime and to
society."7 Along with prior case law on the nature of restitution,9 the
legislative history convinced the court that restitution was a criminal
penalty under the statute, and that retroactive application of the
MVRA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.-
Recently, the Fifth Circuit has joined the majority by holding that
restitution is a criminal penalty and therefore retroactive application
of the MVRA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.81 Currently,
only the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have not expressed an opin-
ion about the permissibility of the retroactive application of the
MVRA.8n
70 Siegel, 153 F3d at 1259.
71 Id at 1260.
72 162 F3d 87,91 (3d Cir 1998).
73 144 F3d 531 (7th Cir 1998).




78 Id. Although the court did not quote the particular statements to which it was referring,
it did cite to particular congressional reports. The legislative history of the statute will be exam-
ined in further detail in Part III.A.2.
79 See United States v Sleight, 808 F2d 1012, 1020 (3d Cir 1987) (despite compensatory as-
pects, restitution remains "inherently a criminal penalty"); United States v Palma, 760 F2d 475,
479-80 (3d Cir 1985) (holding that restitution under the VWPA is a criminal penalty).
80 Edwards, 162 F3d at 91-92.
81 United States v Richards, 204 F3d 177,213 (5th Cir 2000) (holding its own precedent re-
garding restitution prevented it from accepting the minority view). See, for example, Rose, 153
F3d at 211 n 1 (stating that the court's prior holdings that restitution is "at least in part, penal"
prevent the court from adopting the reasoning that restitution under the CSRA is not punish-
ment); United States v Corn, 836 F2d 889,895-96 (5th Cir 1988) (holding that retroactive applica-
tion of the VWPA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause).
82 However, these courts' precedents indicate they would probably join the majority view.
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2. The minority view.
The Seventh Circuit created a circuit split in 1998, with its ruling
in Newman." In Newman, the court held retroactive application of the
MVRA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because restitution
was a civil, not a criminal, penalty.' The court based this conclusion on
a number of factors. First, it noted the traditional view of restitution as
an "equitable device for restoring victims to the position they had oc-
cupied prior to a wrongdoer's actions."" The court then cited cases
holding that restitution was mainly a compensatory device, and not
punitive." The Seventh Circuit highlighted one of its own cases, in
which it had held under a different statute that "[r]estitution is not
'punishment' within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause."' The
court drew further support for its conclusion that restitution is not a
criminal penalty from the Supreme Court's guidelines regarding thecivil/criminal distinction."
The Seventh Circuit first examined the statute, pursuant to the
Supreme Court guidelines," to determine if Congress had expressed a
clear intent to designate restitution as civil or criminal.'O Unlike the
Eighth Circuit," the Seventh Circuit hesitated to give too much weight
The First Circuit held in United States v Gilberg that retroactive application of the 1990 amended
VWPA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because restitution was part of the criminal sen-
tence. 75 F3d 15, 22 (1st Cir 1996). And both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits issued recent opinions
stating restitution under the VWPA and MVRA was a criminal penalty, although these cases did
not arise explicitly within the context of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v Karam, 201
F3d 320, 328 (4th Cir 2000) (asserting "restitution under the VWPA is primarily penal in na-
ture"); United States v Vandeberg, 201 F3d 805, 814 (6th Cir 2000) (declaring "[r]estitution is a
part of one's sentence under the statutory scheme" of the MVRA and thus a defendant must
have the criminal protection of having an "opportunity to be heard").
83 144F3d531.
84 Id at 542. Although the Seventh Circuit reached a different conclusion than the other
courts, it did note its agreement regarding the "substantive change" created by the MVRA. Id at
537 n 5. A substantive change is required by the Supreme Court in Weaver. See text accompany-
ing notes 25-27. The court stated that removing the discretionary power of the judge to award
restitution as well as making the defendant's financial status irrelevant did signify an "increase"
in punishment. Newman, 144 F3d at 537 n 5. Thus, the only element saving retroactive applica-
tion of the MVRA from violating the Ex Post Facto Clause is the fact that it is a civil penalty.
85 Id at 538.
86 Id at 538-39. See, for example, United States v Gifford, 90 F3d 160, 163 (6th Cir 1996)
(stating "a primary purpose of restitution is to compensate the innocent victim of a crime");
United States v Rochester, 898 F2d 971, 983 (5th Cir 1990) (stating "the purpose of the VWPA is
'to ensure that wrongdoers, to the degree possible, make their victims whole"') (citation omit-
ted).
87 Newman, 144 F3d at 538-39, quoting United States v Black, 125 F3d 454, 467 (7th Cir
1997) (involving the CSRA). Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit did not draw a dis-
tinction between the two acts. See note 61 and accompanying text.
88 See Newman, 144 F3d at 540. See also Part I.
89 See notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
90 Newman, 144 F3d at 540-41.
91 See Williams, 128 F3d at 1241.
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to the word "penalty" in the statute.2 It noted that the word "penalty"
could refer to either a civil or criminal penalty and that even the Su-
preme Court has used the word penalty to describe a "civil penalty."93
Finding no conclusive evidence in the express language of the statute,
the court proceeded to examine the seven factors set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Mendoza-Martinez)9
Upon applying the factors, the court determined that restitution
was "not 'so punitive either in purpose or effect' as to acquire a crimi-
nal character."9 As for the first factor, the court stated that restitution
was not an affirmative disability or restraint because it was not analo-
gous to imprisonment. The second factor examines the historical view
of the sanction, and the court declared that "historically, restitution
has been considered an equitable, remedial measure."' The third fac-
tor, regarding scienter, also supported the non-punitive nature of resti-
tution because the MVRA did not have an independent requirement
of scienter for restitution to be applicable.9 The court combined the
fourth, sixth, and seventh factors regarding the purposes of the sanc-
tion to note that the primary purpose of restitution was not retribution
and deterrence, but compensation for the victims.99 Although the fifth
factor (whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a
crime) weighed toward the criminal side, the court believed that, on
balance, the factors leaned overwhelmingly toward a civil characteri-
zation." TIhe Seventh Circuit thereby concluded that restitution under
the MVRA was "not a criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex
Post Facto Clause."'1
The Seventh Circuit has gained one supporter, the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit confronted the ex post facto issue in an emotionally
charged case involving Terry Lynn Nichols, a coconspirator in the
92 Newman, 144 F3d at 540 n 9.
93 Id. See Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99 (1997) ("Even in those cases where the
legislature 'has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,' as to 'transfor[m] what
was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."') (citations omitted).
94 See text accompanying notes 35-41.
95 Newman, 144 F3d at 540 (citations omitted).
96 Id at 540-41.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id at 541-42.
100 Id at 541 n 10.
101 Id at 542. Although in the minority, the Seventh Circuit has continually rejected oppor-
tunities to overrule itself. See United States v Lopez, 222 F3d 428,440 (7th Cir 2000) ("declin[ing]
to reconsider the holding in Newman"); United States v Bach, 172 F3d 520,522-23 (7th Cir 1999)
(declining the defendant's invitation to overrule Newman, stating "[o]urs is a minority view, but
we think it is correct") (citations omitted); United States v Szarwark, 168 F3d 993, 998 (7th Cir
1999) (reversing the district court opinion that retroactive application of the MVRA violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause).
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Oklahoma City bombing.' In United States v Nichols,' the court re-
lied mainly on its own precedent o determine whether restitution un-
der the MVRA was a civil or criminal penalty."'° The court examined
previous cases holding restitution was not punitive in nature."'" Based
on these cases, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the law in this circuit
has been established ... and we are obliged to follow it."' ' In holding
that restitution was not punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause
and that retroactive application of the MVRA was thereby permissi-
ble, the court noted that it "accept[ed] the view of the Seventh Circuit
... and reject[ed] the views of the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, Elev-
enth and D.C. Circuits to the contrary."'' 7
III. CLASSIFYING RESTITUTION UNDER THE MVRA
This Comment offers a solution to the debate among the circuit
courts regarding the retroactive application of the MVRA. The meth-
ods used by the various circuit courts permit characterizing restitution
under the MVRA as either a civil or criminal penalty. However, since
labeling restitution under the MVRA as a civil penalty would trigger
Seventh Amendment concerns, possibly invalidating the statute, courts
should classify restitution under the MVRA as a criminal penalty. In
light of this determination, retroactive application of the MVRA
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
A. Reasoning by the Circuit Courts
The Seventh Circuit, which expounds the minority position, has
provided the most comprehensive evaluation of the issue. This Com-
ment attempts to engage in a thorough analysis to support the major-
ity view, which has heretofore been underdeveloped. Some of the cir-
cuit courts on the majority side have given no reasons at all for their
102 See, for example, Lisa Anderson, Now Fear Grips Even Small Towns, Chi Trib N16 (Apr
20, 1995) (detailing the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing); James C. McKinley, Jr., Terror
in Oklahoma City: Around the Nation Aftershocks of Terror Spread Out Quickly after the Explo-
sion in Oklahoma City, NY Times B10 (Apr 20, 1995) (describing the fear people felt after the
bombing); Sue Anne Pressley, Bomb Kills Dozens in Oklahoma Federal Building, Wash Post Al
(Apr 20,1995) (describing the scene of the bombing).
103 169 F3d 1255 (10th Cir 1999).
104 Id at 1279-80.
105 See United States v Hampshire, 95 F3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir 1996) (holding restitution un-
der the CSRA was not criminal punishment); United States v Arutunoff, 1 F3d 1112,1121 (10th
Cir 1993) ("The VWPA's purpose is not to punish defendants or to provide a windfall for crime
victims but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their
losses.").
106 Nichols, 169 F3d at 1279-80, citing Hampshire, 95 F3d at 1006, and Arutunoff, 1 F3d at
1121.
107 Nichols, 169 F3d at 1280 n 9.
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holdings."' Others have not clearly refuted the Seventh Circuit's rea-
sons."° Circuit courts on both sides (such as the Fifth and Tenth Cir-
cuits) rely heavily on their own precedent, although their opposing
views demonstrate that the case law regarding the nature of restitu-
tion is mixed."" Those courts that have addressed the issue in detail
have relied on the express statutory language, legislative history, and,
in the Seventh Circuit's case, factors mandated by the Supreme Court.
However, as will be demonstrated, these approaches do not lead to a
clear solution and instead only prove that either interpretation of res-
titution under the MVRA is plausible. This Comment aims to provide
a lucid and doctrinally sound justification for the majority's conclu-
sion.
1. Text of the MVRA.
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits relied on the express language
of the statute to determine whether it was criminal or civil."' In par-
ticular, both courts focused on the statutory term "penalty." However,
these courts did not explain why the word penalty, without a qualifier,
definitively means a "criminal penalty." As the Seventh Circuit
pointed out, the Supreme Court has used the word "penalty" in con-
junction with the word "civil" to mean a civil remedy."2 Congress also
recognizes both civil and criminal penalties. It has enacted a number
of statutes in which it uses the term "civil penalty" to designate a rem-
edy that is available in a civil suit.13 In addition, in statutes that make
no reference to a "civil penalty," Congress has still used the term
"criminal penalty."" Congress may have feared that the word "pen-
alty," without a qualifier, would be ambiguous. Since Congress recog-
nizes both civil and criminal penalties and has labeled them as such in
108 See note 56.
109 See, for example, Siegel, 153 F3d at 1259 (not explaining why "penalty" necessarily
means a criminal penalty as opposed to a civil penalty).
110 See notes 81 and 105.
111 See Williams, 128 F3d at 1241; Siegel, 153 F3d at 1259.
112 Newman, 144 F3d at 540 n 9. See also note 93 and accompanying text.
113 See 15 USC § 80b-9(e)(1) (1994) (noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission
could "bring an action in a United States district court to seek ... a civil penalty"); 15 USC
§ 687g(a) (1994) ("The civil penalties provided for in this section ... may be recovered in a civil
action."); 33 USC § 944(h) (1994) ("All civil penalties ... shall be collected by civil suit."). See
also 18 USC §§ 2248, 2259, 2264,2327 (1994 & Supp 1998) (all containing the phrase "any other
civil or criminal penalty") (emphasis added).
114 See, for example, 18 USC § 2332 (1994) (entitled "Criminal penalties"); 20 USC § 1097
(1994) (same); 10 USC § 2408 (1994) (entitled "Prohibition on persons convicted of defense con-
tract related felonies and related criminal penalties on defense contractors"); 10 USC § 2538(f)
(1994) (listing the "criminal penalty" for a violation).
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various statutes, the word "penalty" without a qualifier does not signal
necessarily that Congress intended for restitution to be criminal."'
2. Legislative history.
The Third Circuit also relied on legislative history to support its
conclusion. Although legislative history is regularly used by courts in
statutory interpretation, in recent years the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed some skepticism about its usefulness."6 In Carter v United
States,"7 the Court asserted that its approach to statutory interpreta-
tion "begin[s] by examining the text, not by 'psychoanalyzing those
who enacted it.""'8 Besides being of questionable authority since it is
not enacted as law, legislative history is also often ambiguous or con-
tradictory." Despite the weaknesses of legislative history, the Supreme
Court continues to consider it in some cases'20 and the Third Circuit
used it to interpret the MVRA.
115 The statutory language of Section 3664, which is the procedural mechanism for both the
MVRA and the VWPA, also demonstrates that both views of restitution are equally supported.
Section 3664 provides that "an order of restitution may be enforced by the United States." 18
USC § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp 1998). One of the main features distinguishing the crimi-
nal system from the civil system is that the United States is a party to the case instead of the vic-
tim. See Stephen Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime 8 (Stevens & Sons 1960) (noting "the
conventional view is that crime is an offense against the state, while a tort is an offense against
individual rights only"). Allowing the United States to enforce the restitution order reinforces
the view that restitution is a criminal penalty. However, this is not the only means of enforce-
ment. Section 3664 also states, "At the request of a victim named in a restitution order, the clerk
of the court shall issue an abstract of judgment certifying that judgment has been entered in fa-
vor of such victim in the amount specified in the restitution order." 18 USC § 3664(m)(1)(B)
(Supp 1998). This judgment serves as "a lien on the property of the defendant" in the same man-
ner "as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction." Id. This method of enforcement supports a
civil view of restitution, because the victim is allowed to enforce the order like a civil judgment.
Thus, the enforcement provision does not resolve the issue.
116 See Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash U L Q
351,355 (1994) (revealing statistics that demonstrate that the Court used legislative history less
in 1992 than in 1981). Merrill attributed this trend to Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, both of
whom refuse to join a majority opinion that relies on legislative history. Id at 365.
117 530 US 255 (2000).
118 Id at 2170, quoting Bank One Chicago, NA v Midwest Bank & Trust Co, 516 US 264,279
(1996) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
119 See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US 597, 622-23 (1991) (Scalia concur-
ring) (criticizing the majority's use of legislative history); Abourezk v Reagan, 785 F2d 1043,1054
n 11 (DC Cir 1986) ("Committee reports, we remind, do not embody the law."). See also Patricia
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
Iowa L Rev 195, 214 (1983) ("It sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late
colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends."').
120 The majority of the Court still considers clear legislative history a valuable aid for inter-
preting ambiguous text. Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 501 US at 610 n 10. Even Justice Scalia will
use legislative history to disconfirm an absurd result. Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490
US 504,527 (1989) (Scalia concurring).
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The Third Circuit's remarks regarding legislative history were
conclusory at best, and did not cite the express language that sup-
ported its characterization of restitution as a criminal penalty.2' A
brief perusal of those legislative reports that the Third Circuit identi-
fied reveals that, contrary to the Third Circuit's assertions, the legisla-
tive history of the MVRA is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the purpose of the MVRA as stated in the
committee report is "to ensure that the loss to crime victims is recog-
nized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due."'2 This
statement supports the compensatory view of restitution, which leads
to a civil label.'2 But, in the discussion that follows, the report also
notes that "this position underestimates ... the potential penalogical
benefits of requiring the offender to be accountable for the harm
caused to the victim.' 2. The idea of penological benefit supports the
retributive purpose of restitution, which leads to a criminal characteri-
zation.n
Statements by various members of Congress also support both
notions of restitution. In fact, some members even referred to the
MVRA as serving two purposes simultaneously, one compensatory
and one retributive. Senator Hatch, a cosponsor of the Bill, stated that
mandatory restitution can "provide important closure to victims of
crime." 12' But he also declared, "[r]estitution has an important pe-
nological function as well.... it forces the criminal to contemplate his
criminal act and truly pay for the crime.'' .7 Senator Biden, the other
cosponsor, emphasized as problematic that "the victim's losses-
emotional, physical, and financial losses-often go completely uncom-
pensated."' Thus the MVRA sends a message: "It says to victims: You
are not alone. We will demand accountability from your wrongdoers,
and we understand that criminals owe a debt not only to society but to
121 Edwards, 162 F3d at 91.
122 S Rep No 104-179 at 12 (cited in note 48).
123 See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv L
Rev 931,934-35 (1984) (noting "the traditional model of the legal system," in which "the goal of
civil law is to compensate private wrongs, whereas the aims of the criminal law are to redress
public wrongs and to protect society by punishing those whose behavior is morally culpable").
124 S Rep No 104-179 at 18 (cited in note 48).
125 See Kelly v Robinson, 479 US 36, 53 (1986) (stating that "criminal proceedings focus on
the State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compen-
sation").
126 141 Cong Rec at S 19278 (cited in note 45) (statement of Sen Hatch). Senator Hatch fur-
ther states, "Far too often our criminal justice system appears to ignore the victims of crime. It
frequently seems that only criminals have rights in the system .... The order of restitution repre-
sents the justice system's recognition that a real person, not only society, has suffered a wrong."
Id at S 19277-78.
127 Id at S 19278.
128 Id (statement of Sen Biden).
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you....9 Senator Feinstein stated, "Victim restitution is a matter of sim-
ple justice. If somebody has been hurt by a criminal, they should be
made whole."' Senator Leahy noted, "We can do more to see that vic-
tims of crime ... are treated with dignity and assisted and compen-
sated with Government help.' 3' The legislative history includes re-
marks on both the compensatory and punitive goals of restitution,
supporting both the civil and criminal nature of restitution.Y This re-
sult is unsurprising-the two purposes are not mutually exclusive.'
3. The Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez factors.
Despite holding the minority viewpoint, the Seventh Circuit was
the only circuit court to rely on the seven Supreme Court
civil/criminal factors in evaluating the issue." The Seventh Circuit be-
lieved that these factors weighed in favor of viewing restitution as a
civil penalty. However, an examination of these factors demonstrates
that such a result is not clear. Some of the factors do support the Sev-
enth Circuit's view of the civil nature of restitution. For example, the
first factor is "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint."3 . As the Supreme Court has noted, "[monetary] sanc-
tions [ ] do not involve an 'affirmative disability or restraint,' as that
term is normally understood..''  Also in favor of the civil view is the
third factor, "whether [the sanction] comes into play only on a finding
of scienter."' .. Since restitution is mandatory, it is ordered without re-
gard to the defendant's state of mind. Although the underlying crimi-
nal statute probably would include a scienter requirement, there is no
independent scienter requirement for restitution itself, as noted by the
Seventh Circuit. 13 Finally the last two factors also support the civil na-
ture of restitution. These are "whether an alternative purpose to which
129 Id. Sen Biden further stated, "[t]his bill also sends an important message to criminals-
you must take responsibility for [y]our actions, and you will pay for the pain you have caused." Id
at S 19278-79.
130 Id at S 19280 (statement of Sen Feinstein).
131 Id at S 19279 (statement of Sen Leahy).
132 142 Cong Rec H 3606 (April 18, 1996) (statement of Rep Hyde) ("Think of victims and
think of victims first."). Congressman Buyer remarked, "Not only will the criminal have to pay a
debt to society, the criminal will also have to make amends to the victim." Id at H 3609 (state-
ment of Rep Buyer).
133 See Hudson v United States, 522 US 93,105 (1997) (noting that a sanction may both de-
ter and serve civil purposes at the same time).
134 See text accompanying note 36.
135 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
136 Hudson v United States, 522 US 93,104 (1997). See also Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603,
617 (1960) (noting that a mere denial of a benefit is not an affirmative disability or restraint and
is "certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment").
137 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
138 See Newman, 144 F3d at 541.
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[the sanction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to this alternative purpose as-
signed.''39 The alternative purpose for restitution besides deterrence
and retribution is compensation. As a compensatory device, restitution
does not seem excessive for its purpose; it merely seeks to make the
victim of a crime whole. Thus, these factors, as declared by the Seventh
Circuit, can be read to support a civil view of restitution.
However, some of the factors on which the Seventh Circuit relied
do not easily support viewing restitution as a civil penalty. The second
factor is "whether [the sanction] has historically been regarded as a
punishment."'' 4 The Seventh Circuit claimed that, historically, restitu-
tion has been viewed as an equitable measure.' In general, Supreme
Court precedent regarding monetary penalties supports this view. The
Supreme Court has stated that "neither money penalties nor debar-
ment has historically been viewed as punishment."'," And it has also
asserted that "[in spite of [monetary penalties'] comparative severity,
such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are
essentially criminal."1
43
The Ninth Circuit disputed the Seventh Circuit's historical view
of restitution in United States v Dubose," stating that "restitution has
historically been understood as punishment.'' Many commentators
share this view. One contends that "restitution has been employed as a
punitive sanction throughout history."' Another commentator notes
that "[w]hile the use of restitution as a criminal sanction began in the
Germanic areas of Europe during the Middle Ages, American legal
scholars have traced the modern imposition of judicial restitution or-
ders to some of the earliest penal codes of the United States."'147 Yet
another commentator states that the "view [of] restitution as only a
civil remedy and not [ ] an appropriate criminal sanction .... is con-
139 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168-69.
140 Id at 168.
141 Newman, 144 F3d at 538.
142 Hudson, 522 US at 104.
143 Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391,400 (1938).
144 146 F3d 1141 (9th Cir 1998).
145 Id at 1145.
146 Note, 97 Harv L Rev at 933 (cited in note 123). See also United States v Carrara, 49 F3d
105, 108 (3d Cir 1995) ("Historically, restitution has occupied a prominent penological posi-
tion.").
147 Lionel M. Lavenue, The Corporation as a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a
Criminal Remedy: Application of the Victim and Witness Protection Act by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations, 18 J Corp L 441,454 (1993) (discussing the history of restitution as
a criminal penalty); Catherine M. Goodwin, The Imposition of Restitution in Federal Criminal
Cases, 62 Fed Prob 95, 95 (1998) ("The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually
every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time."), quoting United States
v Webb, 30 F3d 687,689 (6th Cir 1994).
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trary to historical precedent.""' Indeed, although the Supreme Court
has not commented on the historical view of restitution, it allowed res-
titution to be a condition for a pardon in 1913 in Bradford v United
States.
49
The Seventh Circuit also believed that the fourth factor, "whether
[the sanction's] operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence,"'' ° supported its view. The Sev-
enth Circuit asserted that although these purposes may be promoted
by restitution, its primary purpose is compensatory."' However, prece-
dent is mote mixed on this topic.5 2 In Kelly v Robinson,"3 the Supreme
Court stated that restitution furthered rehabilitative and deterrent
goals of the criminal system.'8 It noted that restitution was "an effec-
tive rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront,
in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.'... It also empha-
sized the deterrent effect of restitution, stating the "direct relation be-
tween the harm and the punishment gives restitution a more precise
deterrent effect than a traditional fine.'. 6 Since restitution seems to
serve both compensatory and punitive purposes, it is difficult to say
with certainty which is the primary purpose."'
Finally, one factor weighs clearly against restitution as a civil pen-
alty, a factor that the Seventh Circuit relegated to a footnote in New-
man.' This factor is "whether the behavior to which [the penalty] ap-plies is already a crime.'. As the Seventh Circuit admitted, since the
148 David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts" and Victim Par-
ticipation in Plea Bargaining, 67 Ind L J 853,859 (1992) (analyzing victims' rights of participation
in the criminal process under a just deserts theory of retribution). See also Schafer, Restitution to
Victims of Crime at 3-7 (cited in note 115) (describing the historical origin of restitution as pun-
ishment).
149 228 US 446 (1913). Thus, whether restitution has historically been viewed as a criminal
sanction or civil remedy is unclear.
150 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
151 See Newman, 144 F3d at 542.
152 See Dubose, 146 F3d at 1144 (holding "restitution under the MVRA is punishment be-
cause the MVRA has not only remedial, but also deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive pur-
poses"); United States v Hairston, 888 F2d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir 1989) (stating "[r]estitution is not
a civil matter; it is a criminal penalty meant to have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect");
United States v Brown, 744 F2d 905, 909 (2d Cir 1984) (remarking "[r]estitution undoubtedly
serves traditional purposes of punishment" and discussing its deterrent effect).
153 479 US 36 (1986) (holding that restitution obligationq are not dischargeable in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding).
154 Id at 49 n 10.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 The Supreme Court has recognized that "all civil penalties have some deterrent effect."
Hudson, 522 US at 102. Thus the "mere presence of a deterrent purpose" does not render a sanc-
tion criminal. Id at 105.
158 See 144 F3d at 541 n 10.
159 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
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MVRA and VWPA only award restitution for criminal violations, the
underlying act will always be a criminal one.'6°
Based on the seven factors enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is
evident that restitution has a dual purpose as both a compensatory
and punitive device. As one court noted, "Criminal restitution rests
with one foot in the world of criminal procedure and sentencing and
the other in civil procedure and remedy.'6' Both interpretations of
restitution under the MVRA are plausible. Consequently, one must
look beyond the statutory text, legislative history, and the seven Su-
preme Court factors in determining whether restitution under the
MVRA is civil or criminal.
Although there are two equally plausible interpretations of the
MVRA, the consequences of the interpretations are not the same. As
will be demonstrated, construing restitution as a civil penalty impli-
cates serious constitutional doubt regarding the MVRA. Applying the
canon of constitutional avoidance results in characterizing restitution
under the MVRA as a criminal penalty.
B. The Seventh Amendment Conundrum
1. The canon of constitutional avoidance.
The Supreme Court has stated that to determine "[w]hether a
particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter
of statutory construction.'62 Various methods of statutory construction
employed thus far, such as the express language of the statute and the
legislative history, have proven ineffective in resolving the debate be-
tween the two interpretations of the MVRA. This Comment argues
that the well-established doctrine of constitutional avoidance", sheds
some light on the otherwise murky statute. The doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance argues that when there are two interpretations of a
statute and one of those is subject to serious constitutional doubt, the
court should reject the constitutionally questionable interpretation.
Since construing restitution under the MVRA as a civil penalty sub-
160 Newman, 144 F3d at 541 n 10.
161 United States v Bruchey, 810 F2d 456,461 (4th Cir 1987) (holding that it is impermissible
to force a defendant to sign a promissory note requiring long term payments in restitution to a
victim).
162 Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99 (1997).
163 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Bldg & Constr Trades Council, 485
US 568, 575 (1988) ("[Wlhere an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise seri-
ous constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."). The Court also emphasized that
"[t]his cardinal principle ... has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate."
Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405,
468 (1989) (stating "constitutional norms deserve a prominent place in statutory interpreta-
tion").
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jects the statute to serious constitutional doubt in light of the Seventh
Amendment, restitution under the MVRA should be construed as a
criminal penalty.
Adrian Vermeule has explained, "Avoidance is perhaps the pre-
eminent canon of federal statutory construction; its pedigree is so
venerable that the Supreme Court invoked its reasoning even before
Marbury v. Madison established the power of substantive judicial re-
view.'"' Other commentators have traced the general principle of
avoidance to Alexander Murray v Charming Betsy,' in which the
Court stated, "[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains."
'
However, Justice Brandeis provided the first detailed explanation of
the canon in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority.' , He reasoned:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitu-
tional question may be avoided.w8
In other words, where there are two interpretations and one is subject
to serious constitutional doubt, a court should construe the statute to
adopt the other, constitutionally sound, interpretation. All that is re-
quired is that one interpretation might be unconstitutional.
'6
Applying constitutional avoidance to the issue at hand means
that interpreting the MVRA to construe restitution as a civil penalty
would implicate Seventh Amendment concerns, thereby triggering se-
rious constitutional questions about the statute's validity. The MVRA
does not provide the defendant with a right to a jury trial on the issue
of restitution. It is possible that if restitution is construed as a civil
penalty, such a right would be required by the Seventh Amendment
and thus, the MVRA would be unconstitutional. The Sixth Amend-
164 Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Georgetown L J 1945, 1948 (1997), citing
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Mossman v Higginson, 4 US (4 DalI) 12,13
(1800) (construing Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 "consistent with the constitution").
165 6 US (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (holding that a foreign ship whose owner had given up U.S.
citizenship in favor of Danish citizenship was not subject to forfeiture).
166 Id at 118.
167 297 US 288,346-48 (1936) (Brandeis concurring) (describing rules the Court has devel-
oped "under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it"). See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex L Rev 1549, 1574 (2000) (stating constitutional avoidance
"has important roots in Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Ashwander").
168 Ashwander, 297 US at 348, quoting Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22,62 (1932).
169 See Vermeule, 85 Georgetown L J at 1949 (cited in note 164) (noting that the modem
approach, which has supplanted the classical approach, "requires only a determination that one
plausible reading might be unconstitutional") (emphasis added).
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ment does not pose a similar problem if restitution is considered a
criminal penalty. Although the Sixth Amendment provides a defen-
dant with a right to a jury trial, ° such a right does not extend to the
sentencing phase.' Since interpreting the MVRA to construe restitu-
tion as a civil penalty would raise serious Seventh Amendment issues,
the canon of constitutional avoidance dictates that this interpretation
be avoided. Thus, restitution under the MVRA should be construed as
a criminal penalty.
2. Jury trials and restitution.
The Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial "[i]n
Suits at common law.'72 If restitution is considered a civil penalty un-
der the MVRA, it is possible that the Seventh Amendment would re-
quire that the defendant have a right to a jury trial. Currently the
MYRA does not provide such a right. Thus far, the courts have ig-
nored the interaction between the ex post facto issue and the Seventh
Amendment issue under the MYRA and VWPA.
All of the appellate courts that have squarely addressed the Sev-
enth Amendment issue under the MVRA or VWPA have held that
restitution is a criminal penalty, so the statutes in question did not vio-
late the Seventh Amendment. In Dubose, the Ninth Circuit, in
examining whether the MVRA violated the Eighth Amendment,
noted "[t]he sanction at issue must be construed as punishment for the
Eighth Amendment to be implicated.''73 It decided that restitution was
punishment because it had "deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive
purposes."'7 The Ninth Circuit also based this conclusion on the legis-
lative history of the statute and the historical view of restitution.5
When the court next analyzed the Seventh Amendment claim, it relied
on the characterization of restitution as punishment to determine that
the Seventh Amendment did not apply.'
This result comports with the conclusions of numerous courts
that have addressed whether the VWPA violates the Seventh
Amendment.'" For example, in United States v Palma,7" the Third Cir-
170 US Const Amend VI.
171 See Spaziano v Florida, 468 US 447,462-63 (1984) (holding that a sentence need not be
imposed by a jury).
172 US Const Amend VII.
173 Dubose, 146 F3d at 1144.
174 Id.
175 Id at 1144-45.
176 Although the court had determined restitution was punishment, it also examined the
more complicated claim that the victim enforcement provision transformed the sentencing pro-
ceeding into an action at common law. Id at 1148. The court held that victim enforcement did not
alter the statute's underlying criminal nature. Id.
177 See United States v Keith, 754 F2d 1388,1392 (9th Cir 1985) (stating "Congress made res-
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cuit stated that "an order of restitution imposed under the VWPA is a
criminal, rather than civil, penalty" and therefore did not violate the
defendant's Seventh Amendment rights.'79 The court looked to con-
gressional intent and, based on legislative history, stated that "Con-
gress intended restitution to be an integral part of the sentencing
process.'1 In addition, the Third Circuit believed certain aspects of
the statute demonstrated that restitution was not a civil penalty. In
particular, "the victim [was] limited to recovering certain specified
losses and [was] not made a party to the sentencing proceeding."'8' In
fact, no appellate court has decided otherwise, as recently noted by
one court: "All circuits that have decided the [Seventh Amendment]
issue have held that restitution under the VWPA is penal and that the
Seventh Amendment simply does not apply to a determination of the
amount of a restitution order."'
Both of the minority circuit courts-the Seventh and the Tenth-
have had cases before them involving a Seventh Amendment chal-
lenge to the VWPA. In United States v Gomer,n the defendant chal-
lenged his restitution sentence in front of the Seventh Circuit.' He
claimed the judge had failed to consider the "financial needs" of his
dependents as directed by the VWPA.'8' In addition to this statutory
claim, he also argued the VWPA was unconstitutional.6 The Seventh
Circuit resolved the issue on statutory grounds and thereby avoided
the constitutional question.'n Interestingly, the dissent argued that the
court should reach the merits and claimed that the VWPA did not vio-
titution under the Act a criminal penalty" and thus the defendant "was not entitled to a jury trial
on the issue of the amount of restitution liability"); United States v Watchman, 749 F2d 616, 617
(10th Cir 1984) (declaring "[riestitution is a permissible penalty imposed on the defendant as
part of sentencing" and "does not infringe on Seventh Amendment rights"); United States v
Brown, 744 F2d 905, 910 (2d Cir 1984) (holding that the "Seventh Amendment is no barrier to
this addition [of restitution] to the arsenal of federal criminal sanctions"); United States v
Satterfield, 743 F2d 827,837 (11th Cir 1984) (declaring "[tihere can be little doubt that Congress
intended the restitution penalties of the VWPA to be incorporated into the traditional sentenc-
ing structure," thus not triggering the protections of the Seventh Amendment); United States v
Florence, 741 F2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir 1984) (asserting restitution under the VWPA "remains an
essentially criminal sanction" thus the "restitution does not violate the seventh amendment").
178 760 F2d 475 (3d Cir 1985).




182 See United States v Rostoff, 164 F3d 63,71 (1st Cir 1999) (finding that an order of resti-
tution without a jury trial did not violate Seventh Amendment or due process).
183 764 F2d 1221 (7th Cir 1985) (holding that it is plain error to fail to consider financial
needs of dependents as required by the VWPA).
184 Id at 1222.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id at 1222 n 1. See also id at 1225 n 8.
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late the Seventh Amendment.'4 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Coffey noted that Congress intended restitution to be "part of the
criminal sentencing procedure and [ ] not .. . a civil remedy."''  How-
ever, this is merely dicta in a dissent of a case decided thirteen years
before Newman, and it is not surprising that the court in Newman
does not address it. The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, actually de-
cided a case on the Seventh Amendment issue.'94 In holding that the
VWPA was constitutional, the court stated, "Restitution is a permissi-
ble penalty imposed on the defendant as part of sentencing."'9' Nota-
bly, the Tenth Circuit did not mention this case in Nichols.""
3. Application of the canon of avoidance to the MVRA.
Construing restitution as a civil penalty implicates a serious con-
stitutional question. A court must decide whether an order of restitu-
tion would be a "suit at common law." '93 The consequences of such a
designation are serious because the MVRA does not provide a right
to a jury trial for restitution orders. Thus, if a court determined that
restitution is a legal remedy, the MVRA would be struck down as un-
constitutional (probably along with the VWPA)."' It is currently un-
clear whether restitution would be considered a legal or equitable
remedy if it were to be classified as a civil penalty.'"5
In United States v Dudley, the Fourth Circuit held that restitu-
tion did not have a purely punitive character and thus did not abate at
the death of the accused like most criminal penalties.'97 However, the
court then was forced to decide whether there was a right to a jury
since it had classified restitution as a civil penalty.'4 The court stated
that this depended on whether the restitution under the VWPA could
188 Id at 1226 (Coffey dissenting).
189 Id at 1228-29.
190 Watchman, 749 F2d at 617 ("[T]he Act insofar as it provides for restitution, and as it
provides for the court to determine the amount (if any), is a constitutional extension of sentenc-
ing.").
191 Id.
192 169 F3d 1255. See text accompanying notes 103-06.
193 The Seventh Amendment only requires jury trials for "[s]uits at common law." US Const
Amend VII. The Seventh Amendment is not applicable to suits in equity.
194 See note 205. Although all the courts addressing the Seventh Amendment question re-
solved it by stating that restitution was a criminal sanction, those courts characterizing restitution
as civil subject the MyRA to possible constitutional invalidation if restitution were determined
also to be legal in nature. Since restitution is the same under both the MVRA and the VWPA,
such a classification would also expose the VWPA to constitutional invalidation as well.
195 The two circuits holding that restitution under the MVRA is a civil penalty have not yet
addressed whether restitution is legal or equitable for the purposes of the Seventh Amendment.
196 739 F2d 175 (4th Cir 1984).
197 Id at 177 (stating that there is a "substantial difference between restitution ... and forfei-
ture").
198 Id at 178.
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be considered an equitable remedy or a legal one.'9 The court noted
the complexity of this question and finally stated, "[i]n short, the ques-
tion whether a jury hearing must be allowed to preserve the constitu-
tionality of [the statute] is a tangled one, with no sure outcome short
of a Supreme Court decision.' ' " The Fourth Circuit avoided having to
decide the issue by stating that since the accuracy of the amount of
restitution was not contested, there was no need to address the Sev-
enth Amendment issue.20'
The Supreme Court has implied that restitution would require a
jury trial if it were to be labeled as a civil penalty. The Court men-
tioned in a footnote in Kelly v Robinson,°  that "[s]everal lower courts
have addressed the constitutionality of the federal Victim and Witness
Protection Act."'23 It noted that these courts have decided that "defen-
dants have no right to jury trial as to the amount of restitution, even
though the Seventh Amendment would require such a trial if the issue
were decided in a civil case." '2 Although this is merely dicta, it strongly
implies that construing restitution as a civil penalty would trigger a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Such a civil con-
struction could lead to a finding that the MVRA and VWPA are un-
constitutional. With regard to the VWPA, some commentators have
made this argument, contending that restitution is a civil, legal remedy
and that the statute is thereby unconstitutional because it violates the
Seventh Amendment.0
Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, if there are two in-
terpretations, and one interpretation is subject to serious constitu-
tional doubt, the court should adopt the less dubious interpretation. In
this case, classifying restitution under the MVRA as a criminal penalty
would allow a court to avoid the difficult task of deciding whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in determining a
restitution order. Thus restitution should be construed as a criminal
199 Id at 178-79.
200 Id at 179.
201 Id. Although the court did not explicitly reference a canon, it was in effect practicing
constitutional avoidance by not deciding the issue unnecessarily.
202 479 US 36 (1986).
203 Id at 53 n 14.
204 Id (emphasis added).
205 See Margaret Raymond, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 Colum L Rev 1590, 1592 (1984) (arguing that "restitu-
tion under the VWPA is the equivalent of civil relief" and thus the defendant has a right to a
jury); Bonnie Arnett Von Roeder, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,63 Tex L Rev 671,691 (1984) (arguing that restitu-
tion under the VWPA is both civil in nature and a "'legal' remedy to which the right of jury trial
attaches").
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penalty, forcing courts to conclude that retroactive application of the
MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.6
At first glance, it may appear that courts must also avoid labeling
restitution as a criminal penalty to eliminate constitutional concerns
under the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, a closer look proves that
such an assumption is false. Under the civil interpretation, if it were
decided that restitution was indeed a legal remedy and that the defen-
dant had a right to a jury trial, then the MVRA would be unconstitu-
tional. The entire statute would be invalidated and Congress would
have to enact a new law that provided such a right. However, if resti-
tution is labeled a criminal penalty, the MVRA is still constitutional
despite the Ex Post Facto Clause. Although it is true that retroactive
application of the MYRA would not be allowed under this interpreta-
tion, the statute itself would remain unchanged. Congress specifically
stated that the MVRA would be effective, "to the extent constitution-
ally permissible ... for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the
defendant is convicted on or after" April 24, 1996 . So if a court de-
termined that retroactive application of the MVRA would violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause, then under Congress's command, the court
would not be allowed to apply the MVRA retroactively. The Ex Post
Facto Clause would only render certain applications of the statute un-
constitutional, thereby preserving the MVRA.
CONCLUSION
Under the MVRA, Congress requires courts to award restitution
to the victim from the criminal. Congress also specified that the effec-
tive date for the Act's implementation was the conviction date instead
of the date of commission of the crime. This specification has forced
some courts to consider whether application of the MVRA to a de-
206 Classifying restitution as criminal does not automatically bar retroactive application of
the MVRA. As noted previously, the Supreme Court has stated in Weaver that the statute must
constitute a substantive change. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text. However, since there
has been no disagreement on this point on either side of the circuit split, it will be assumed for
purposes of this Comment that the test in Weaver would be satisfied. See note 11. Interestingly,
however, some unpublished cases have held the MVRA was not a substantive change in the law.
Since these cases are unpublished, they do not carry substantial precedential weight. See United
States v Ledford, 1997 US App LEXIS 29167, *12-13 (6th Cir) (unpublished) (concluding that
applying the MVRA did not result in an "increased order of restitution"); United States v Jack-
son, 1998 US App LEXIS 11645, *4 (6th Cir) (unpublished) (holding that "[u]nder the old stat-
ute, the district court was free to impose the same amount of restitution" and therefore, the pen-
alty was not made more severe); United States v Braunstein, 1997 US App LEXIS 5548, *8 (2d
Cir) (unpublished) (noting that since the same result would be reached under the old statute and
the amended version, the "punishment has not been enhanced").
207 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act § 211, 18 USC § 2248 note (effective date of 1996
amendments) (emphasis added).
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fendant who was convicted after the effective date but who committed
the crime before that date violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
This Comment has attempted to resolve the debate by examining
the reasoning on both sides of the issue and demonstrating why the
methods used heretofore could support either the civil or criminal
view of the nature of restitution. Despite the equal plausibility of both
interpretations, the classification of restitution has significant conse-
quences. Many constitutional provisions are triggered by either a
criminal or civil label. As this Comment has demonstrated, construing
restitution under the MVRA as civil raises serious Seventh Amend-
ment concerns. Because courts should avoid interpretations of statutes
that create such constitutional difficulties, this Comment concludes
that courts should consider restitution under the MVRA a criminal
penalty. Therefore, courts should hold that retroactive application of
the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
F---m--&7
